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Abstract
Background: This research evaluates the effect of hospital competition on inward and outward patient transfers for
different types of payers including the uninsured. Although it is a less spotlighted issue, an equally important topic
is the likelihood of inter-hospital patient transfers of the insured and the uninsured. This study attempts to fill a gap
in the research about the relationship between hospital competition and patient transfers.
Methods: By developing the payer-specific level of hospital competition, this research evaluates the effect of
hospital competition on inward and outward patient sharing (or patient transfers) for different types of payers
including the uninsured. For patient transfers, instead of focusing on whether a patient is transferred from one
hospital to another hospital at the patient level, we measure the numbers of patient transfers between hospitals
(both inward and outward) at the hospital level. These dependent variables—the numbers of outward and inward
patient transfers by the principal payers—are count variables, and we employ either a Poisson regression model or
a negative binomial regression model.
Results: Controlling for hospital characteristics, when the uninsured Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) increased by
0.01, the uninsured were 593 % more likely to be transferred to another hospital. When a hospital dominates its
market, it tends to expel uninsured patients to other hospitals.
Conclusion: If patient transfers are medically unnecessary and primarily due to financial incentives, health
administrators and policymakers should minimize such events. Since the uninsured who are admitted to a hospital
that dominates its hospital market are likely to be much more vulnerable in their access to health care services, the
state government of Florida needs to move toward increased health insurance coverage for eligible Floridians.
Keywords: Uninsured, Patient transfers, Hospital competition
Background
Among all Americans, 54.9 % have their health insur-
ance coverage through employer-sponsored programs
and 32.6 % are through government programs such as
Medicare, Medicaid, SCHIP and CHAMPVA [1]. Al-
though the coverage for non-elderly Americans in-
creased between 2011 and 2012 [2], the number of the
uninsured was still over 47 million in the U.S. Unlike
other developed countries, there is no national health in-
surance program in the U.S. Instead, a majority of
Americans have coverage through their employers. Even
if they are offered coverage, however, a large number of
employees cannot afford their share of the premiums be-
cause of the high cost [3].
More specifically, Florida has the second highest unin-
sured rate in the nation. In 2013, a total of 3.8 million
people were uninsured and this represents about 25 % of
the state’s population [4]. The Affordable Care Act
(ACA) was passed in 2010 and it provided Florida a
great opportunity to cover a substantially large propor-
tion of the uninsured. In June 2012, however, the Federal
Supreme Court ruled that each state is responsible for
implementing Medicaid expansion to cover the low-
income uninsured in the state. Republican Governor
Scott and the Republican-led Legislature have relent-
lessly expressed their opposition to the ACA. Even as of
today, they are not planning to implement Medicaid ex-
pansion. Although more than 440,000 Floridians signed
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up for health insurance under the ACA during the 6-
month enrollment period, if the state had allowed Me-
dicaid expansion, the number of uninsured would have
been reduced at a much faster rate.
The consequences of being uninsured are well docu-
mented in the literature. For instance, the uninsured
have less access to care, including preventive care, and
chronic disease management [5–7]; they are at higher
risk for preventable hospitalizations and have higher
chances of missed diagnoses of serious conditions [8];
they have fewer follow-up visits, delayed subsequent
care, and significantly higher mortality rates [9]; and
they have less of a chance of receiving high-tech care
[10]. For these reasons, the primary goal of the ACA is
to lower the number of uninsured by providing afford-
able health insurance to low-income Americans.
Although it is a less spotlighted issue compared to the
previous mentioned problems, an equally important
topic is the likelihood of inter-hospital patient transfers
between the insured and the uninsured. Various studies
have found that insurance status influences inter-
hospital patient transfer patterns [11–14].
Public hospitals and academic medical centers may
admit more poorly insured transfer patients than do
other institutions. Researchers have investigated the rela-
tionship between patient insurance status and inter-
hospital patient transfers. Using the 2000 inpatient dis-
charge data from California, Green et al. [14] revealed
that a patient’s insurance status affected the likelihood of
a hospital admitting a transfer patient. After dividing pa-
tients into good payer and poor payer patients based on
the expected level of insurance reimbursement, they
concluded that good payer patients were more likely to
be transferred than were poor payer patients. Another
study by Babu et al. [11], using the 2002 to 2006 Ameri-
can College of Surgeons National Trauma Databank,
showed that uninsured patients are more likely to be
transferred out of a Level II or III facility and are less
likely to be accepted by a Level II or III facility for trans-
fer compared with privately insured patients. By employ-
ing the 1991 data on all general acute care neo-pediatric
hospitals in five counties in Pennsylvania, Durbin et al.
[12] found that uninsured infants were twice as likely to
be transferred compared to privately insured infants
even after controlling for prematurity, severity of illness,
and the level of neonatal intensive care units in the re-
ferring hospital. Recently, based on the comparison be-
tween transferred and nontransferred patients with a
primary hand diagnosis at two trauma referral centers in
Boston, Massachusetts, Eberlin et al. [13] revealed that
the number of the uninsured was greater for transferred
patients.
Presently, there are very few studies that have exam-
ined the relationship between hospital competition and
inter-hospital patient transfers. Using data on 35 hospi-
tals in an Italian region from 2003 to 2007, Mascia et al.
[15] revealed that an increase in inter-hospital competi-
tion (i.e., measured by the overlap of hospitals using
common resources) is associated with an increase in the
number of patients transferred between dyads of hospi-
tals. Another study that examined the relationship
between hospital competition and inter-hospital trans-
fers was done by Lomi and Pallotti [16]. By examining
patient transfer relations among members of a commu-
nity of hospital organizations located in Lazio, Italy, they
found that hospitals are more likely to transfer patients
when they are competing more intensely for patients
across multiple geographical segments of their market.
Unfortunately, there has been no study that examines
the relationship between hospital competition and inter-
hospital patient transfers using U.S. data. Based on pre-
vious studies, a general consensus is that when a hospital
is located in a more competitive market (i.e., having
multiple competitors and/or a prominent competitor), it
is more likely to admit less lucrative patients due to
market pressures. When a hospital is located in a less
competitive market (i.e., the hospital dominates its hos-
pital market), however, it has more leverage to select out
of its business those patients who are less profitable. It is
a well-known fact that admitting the uninsured is finan-
cially risky because there is a higher chance that they
will not pay the bill. Based on this perspective, it could
be possible to infer that uninsured patients are more
vulnerable to inter-hospital transfers. Another perspec-
tive would be that when a hospital dominates its market,
especially if the hospital is nonprofit or public, it then
admits more uninsured patients in order to show that it
is doing its job.
In sum, the main objective of this study is to examine
how hospital competition affects patient-sharing networks
for different payer groups. By developing the payer-
specific level of hospital competition, this research evalu-
ates the effect of hospital competition on inward and out-
ward patient sharing (or patient transfers) for different
types of payers including the uninsured and also provides
an understanding of the health equity issues surrounding
the market structure of hospitals and the insurance status
of patients in particular within Florida, USA.
Methods
Data
There are two data sources from the Florida Agency for
Health Care Administration for this study: 1) the 2010
Hospital Inpatient Discharge Data, which includes all
the information about inpatient discharges; and 2) the
2010 Hospital Financial Data Book, which contains gen-
eral hospital characteristics. The unit of analysis is the
general acute-care hospital in Florida.
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Construction of variables and statistical analyses
The dependent variables are the dyadic payer-specific
patient-sharing relations between hospitals, which are
measured by counting the number of transfers consider-
ing both inward patient sharing (i.e., the transfers from
other hospitals to focal hospitals) and outward patient
sharing (i.e., the transfers from focal hospitals to other
hospitals). Instead of focusing on whether a specific pa-
tient is transferred from one hospital to another hospital
at the patient level [11–14], we measure the numbers of
patient transfers between hospitals (both inward and
outward) at the hospital level [17–19]. More specifically,
to measure such dyadic relations, we traced all the
patient transfers with the same patient IDs between hos-
pitals, which occurred within the same or the immediate
following day, and counted the numbers of inward and
outward transfers by considering their directions separ-
ately. These dependent variables—the numbers of out-
ward and inward patient transfers by the principal
payers—are count variables that show enormously zero-
inflated distributions. Due to the zero-inflated distribu-
tions, we employed a standard count data model such as
either a negative binomial regression model or a Poisson
regression model based on each model’s over-dispersion
parameter [20, 21]. The negative binomial regression as-
sumes that the dependent count variable y follows a
negative binomial distribution given the independent
variables x:








ð1þ αμÞk þ 1=α
; k ¼ 0; 1; 2; …;
where α is an overdispersion parameter. The statistical
significance of the estimated coefficient α determines the
choice between the negative binomial model and the
Poisson model: if α is significantly different from zero
(0), the utilization of the negative binomial regression
analysis is correct.
The primary independent variable is payer-specific
hospital competition. To measure payer-specific hospital
competition, we adopted a model used by Zwanziger
and Melnick [22]. Instead of measuring hospital compe-
tition within an arbitrarily defined hospital market (i.e.,
geopolitical boundaries such as cities and counties), we
employed the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) as a
measure of hospital competition. The payer-specific
HHIs we used were based on the patient-origins data by
patient zip code in each of the payer groups to deter-
mine the extent of each hospital’s market [22] for spe-
cific payer groups. The payer-specific HHIs for a
hospital market is the sum of the squared market shares
for all the hospitals competing in the market for each
payer group. The HHIs range from 0 to 1, with lower
levels of HHI indicating greater competition.
For control variables, we used hospital ownership (i.e.,
for-profit, non-profit, and public), location (i.e., urban
vs. rural), teaching status (i.e., teaching vs. non-
teaching), hospital case mix index (CMI), total number
of discharges, average length of stay, occupancy rate, and
the difference between revenue and cost per adjusted
admission.
With the variables constructed as shown above, we de-
veloped two models to examine the effects of competi-
tion among hospitals on patient sharing: one for
outward transferred patients from focal hospitals and
the other for inward transferred patients to focal hospi-
tals. The Incidence Rate Ratio (IRR), which is used to re-
port the Poisson or negative binomial regression results,
represents a change in the dependent variable in terms
of a percentage increase or decrease, with the percentage
determined by the amount that the IRR is either above
or below one (1) [23]. For example, an IRR reporting
(1.32) would be written as a 32 % increase ((a value 0.32
more than 1) × 100) with every one unit increase in an
independent variable. An IRR reporting (0.68) would be
written as a 32 % decrease ((a value 0.32 less than 1) ×
100) with every one unit increase in an independent
variable.
Results
Descriptive statistics and visualizations of inter-hospital
patient transfers
As Table 1 indicates, among the 172 hospitals located in
Florida, 155 hospitals had Medicare, Medicaid, Commer-
cial health insurance, and uninsured patients; 153 hospi-
tals had Medicare managed care patients; and 146
hospitals had Medicaid managed care patients. Each
hospital, on average, transferred 6.82 patients in total:
1.61 Medicare patients; .35 Medicare Managed Care pa-
tients; 1.58 Medicaid patients; .23 Medicaid Managed
Care patients; 1.05 commercial health insurance pa-
tients; and .20 uninsured patients. Hospitals in Florida
confront the low level of competition with the mean
HHIs ranging from .42 for commercial health insurance
to .58 for Medicaid Managed Care. On average, almost
half of the hospitals are for-profits; 5 % of the hospitals
are involved in teaching.
We also provide a visualization of the payer-specific
patient-sharing networks to improve our understanding
of the characteristics inherent within inter-hospital rela-
tionships by using several attributive variables from each
hospital (see Fig. 1). In each patient-sharing network, the
size of the nodes is proportional to each hospital’s total
and payer-specific HHIs. The arrowheads around the
nodes indicate the direction of the patient transfers be-
tween two hospitals. The colors of the nodes are based
on each hospital’s ownership: green for profits; red for
non-profits; and blue for public hospitals. The shapes of
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the nodes are based on the hospital’s teaching status:
squares for non-teaching and pentagons for teaching
hospitals.
Effects of hospital competition on patient transfers
As mentioned previously, we evaluated the effects of
competition among hospitals on patient sharing with
two models: one for outward transferred patients from
focal hospitals (see Table 2) and the other for inward
transferred patients to focal hospitals (see Table 3).
Controlling for the variables regarding hospital charac-
teristics, hospitals were 59,382 % (IRR = 594.82, p < .05)
more likely to transfer uninsured patients to other hos-
pitals with every one unit increase in uninsured HHI. As
mentioned earlier, HHIs range from 0 to 1. More realis-
tically, therefore, as the uninsured HHI increases by
0.01, the uninsured were 593 % more likely to be trans-
ferred to another hospital. For the uninsured, when a
hospital is located in a less competitive market, outward
patient sharing increases. That is, when a hospital domi-
nates the market, it tends to expel uninsured patients to
other hospitals.
Holding all other hospital-related attributes constant,
hospitals were 98 % (IRR = .02, p < .05) less likely to
transfer Medicare patients to other hospitals with every
one unit increase in Medicare HHI. As the Medicare
HHI increases by 0.01, Medicare patients are .98 % less
likely to be transferred to another hospital. For Medicare
Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total outward patients 155 6.82 17.74 0 150
Total inward patients 155 6.82 16.16 0 150
Medicare outward patients 155 1.61 4.95 0 44
Medicare inward patients 155 1.61 3.73 0 36
Medicare managed care outward patients 153 .35 1.11 0 10
Medicare managed care inward patients 153 .35 .85 0 5
Medicaid outward patients 155 1.58 5.19 0 39
Medicaid inward patients 155 1.58 5.40 0 52
Medicaid managed care outward patients 146 .23 .79 0 5
Medicaid managed care inward patients 146 .23 .72 0 4
Commercial health insurance outward patients 155 1.05 3.01 0 28
Commercial health insurance inward patients 155 1.05 2.76 0 23
Uninsured outward patients 155 .20 .99 0 10
Uninsured inward patients 155 .20 .69 0 6
Total HHI 155 .42 .10 .20 .84
Medicare HHI 155 .47 .11 .21 .76
Medicare managed care HHI 153 .53 .12 .26 1
Medicaid HHI 155 .48 .10 .26 .85
Medicaid managed care HHI 146 .58 .14 .32 1
Commercial Health Insurance HHI 155 .42 .09 .25 .80
Uninsured HHI 155 .55 .11 .33 .91
For profit 155 .50 a 0 1
Non-profit 155 .39 a 0 1
Public 155 .09 a 0 1
Teaching 155 .05 a 0 1
Rural 155 .12 a 0 1
CMI 155 1.32 .21 .72 2.14
Total # of discharges 155 14986.8 15802.9 223 127089
Average length of stay 155 3.40 .52 2.24 6.20
Occupancy rate 155 54.33 15.92 5.16 87.66
(Revenue per adjusted admission)-(Cost per adjusted admission) 155 5958.6 1659.4 3413.9 12957.6
Note: adesignates binary variable (0, 1)
Lee et al. International Journal for Equity in Health  (2016) 15:85 Page 4 of 9
Fig. 1 Payer-Specific patients transfer networks
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IRR (SE)a IRR (SE)a IRR (SE)a IRR (SE)a IRR (SE)a IRR (SE)a IRR (SE)b
Total HHI .17 (.31)
Medicare HHI .02** (.03)
Medicare Managed Care HHI .02 (.06)
Medicaid HHI 1.17 (2.80)
Medicaid Managed Care HHI .17 (.47)
Commercial Health Insurance HHI 3.04 (5.89)
Uninsured HHI 594.82** (1570.31)
For Profit (0 = Public) 2.94* (1.64) 3.98* (3.08) 1.14 (.81) 1.97 (1.75) .49 (.46) 2.36 (1.73) 2.63 (2.68)
Non-profit (0 = Public) 1.82 (.99) 3.01 (2.26) .71 (.48) 1.34 (1.10) 1.13 (.99) 2.51 (1.68) .35 (.34)
Teaching (0 = Non-teaching) .27* (.20) 1.29 (1.14) 4.87** (3.43) .24 (.24) .23 (.29) .76 (.55) 13.69*** (7.78)
Rural (0 = Urban) 1.67 (.98) 6.89*** (4.74) 1.23 (1.48) 1.12 (1.45) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00)
CMI 215.18*** (277.66) 534.67*** (811.82) 45.72** (74.87) 96.77** (197.13) 35.79 (77.84) 40.34*** (55.12) 303.1** (680.84)
ln(Total # of Discharges) 1.0001*** (.00) 1.0001*** (.00) 1.00004*** (.00) 1.0001*** (.00) 1.00004** (.00) 1.00005*** (.00) 1.0001*** (.00)
Average Length of Stay 2.84** (1.30) 2.63* (1.41) 1.48 (.84) 1.37 (.89) 5.33* (4.58) 2.52* (1.23) 6.47*** (4.44)
Occupancy Rate 1.01 (.01) 1.02* (.01) 1.01 (.01) .99 (.01) 1.01 (.02) 1.00 (.01) 1.03 (.02)
(Revenue per Adjusted Admission) – (Cost
per Adjusted Admission)
.99 (.00) .99*** (.00) .99** (.00) 1.00 (.00) .99 (.00) .99 (.00) .99** (.00)
Overdispersion Parameter 2.14*** (.34) 1.90*** (.48) .65** (.46) 3.49*** (.90) 1.85*** (1.07) 1.44*** (.41)
Model χ2 85.95 69.41 45.63 54.25 29.43 67.88 121.66
df 10c 10c 10c 10c 10c 10c 10c
Pseudo R2 .11 .15 .20 .14 .18 .17 .57
N 155 155 153 155 146 155 155
Notes: *p < .1, **p < .05, ***p < .01
aNegative binomial regression model
bPoisson regression model






















IRR (SE)a IRR (SE)a IRR (SE)a IRR (SE)a IRR (SE)a IRR (SE)a IRR (SE)a
Total HHI 1.40 (2.09)
Medicare HHI 4.60 (6.76)
Medicare Managed Care HHI .02 (.06)
Medicaid HHI 2.12 (4.52)
Medicaid Managed Care HHI .02 (.08)
Commercial Health Insurance HHI 1.90 (3.99)
Uninsured HHI .43 (1.27)
For Profit (0 = Public) 1.10 (.50) 2.25 (1.34) 1.14 (.81) .53 (.36) .16* (.15) 1.28 (.87) .89 (.73)
Non-profit (0 = Public) 1.21 (.55) 2.78* (1.58) .71 (.48) .53 (.37) .48 (.39) 1.63 (1.02) .40 (.36)
Teaching (0 = Non-teaching) .55 (.37) 2.13 (1.69) 4.87** (3.43) .38 (.37) 1.60 (2.19) .68 (.56) 1.40 (1.69)
Rural (0 = Urban) .92 (.45) 1.29 (.79) 1.23 (1.48) .80 (.77) .00 (.00) .26 (.30) 1.95 (2.18)
CMI 63.94*** (73.79) 70.92*** (88.77) 45.72** (74.87) 39.64** (69.25) 13.24 (32.77) 26.04** (37.10) 25.99 (59.35)
ln(Total # of Discharges) 1.0001*** (.00) 1.00003** (.00) 1.00004*** (.00) 1.0001*** (.00) 1.0001* (.00) 1.0001*** (.00) 1.00 (.00)
Average Length of Stay 3.02*** (1.28) 3.28** (1.63) 1.48 (.84) 1.62 (.88) 3.22 (2.87) 1.82 (.88) 2.39 (1.83)
Occupancy Rate 1.01 (.01) 1.01 (.01) 1.01 (.01) 1.01 (.01) 1.01 (.02) 1.00 (.01) 1.03 (.01)
(Revenue per Adjusted Admission) – (Cost
per Adjusted Admission)
.99*** (.00) .99*** (.00) .99** (.00) .99 (.00) .99 (.00) .99 (.00) .99 (.00)
Overdispersion Parameter 1.68*** (.26) 1.56*** (.25) .65** (.46) 2.38*** (.56) 2.48*** (1.28) 1.70*** (.45) 2.92*** (1.52)
Model χ2 84.75 57.08 45.63 62.37 26.95 55.30 13.55
df 10b 10b 10b 10b 10b 10b 10b
Pseudo R2 .10 .11 .20 .14 .16 .14 .08
N 155 155 153 155 146 155 155
Notes: *p < .1, **p < .05, ***p < .01
aNegative binomial regression model













patients, when a hospital is located in a less competitive
market, outward patient sharing decreases. That is, when
a hospital dominates the market, it tends to retain more
Medicare patients.
Discussion and conclusions
In 2010, there were about 1.46 million inpatient dis-
charges in 155 general acute care hospitals in Florida.
Among those discharges, there were only 1059 patient
transfers between hospitals. If we had employed a looser
definition of patient transfers, the number would have
been higher than 1059. Even if there had been a smaller
number of patient transfers, this study is a first attempt to
understand how hospital competition affects patient trans-
fer activities using a dyadic relationship between hospitals.
As mentioned earlier, the Florida hospital market is less
competitive (i.e., HHIs range from .42 to .58) even if we
look at the different payers. In a such hospital market, it is
unclear how hospitals behave in relation to patient shar-
ing. This study reveals that when a hospital is located in a
less competitive market, or when a hospital is dominating
its market, it tends to transfer uninsured patients to an-
other hospital. Under the same conditions, on the other
hand, a hospital is less likely to transfer Medicare patients
from its facility to another hospital. That is, beyond the re-
lationship between insurance status and inter-hospital
transfers examined in the previous studies [11–14], we
could show differentiated relationships between the mar-
ket structure of the hospital and patient transfers based on
their insurance status. As our findings indicate, the unin-
sured who are admitted to a hospital that dominates its
hospital market are likely to be much more vulnerable in
their access to health care services, requiring the state
government of Florida to move toward increased health
insurance coverage for eligible Floridians.
It is unclear the exact reason for patient transfers es-
pecially for the different patterns of patient transfers
among different payers. Thus, it is important to discern
whether or not patient transfers are medically necessary.
If such transfers are medically necessary, they should be
promoted and recommended. If they are medically un-
necessary and primarily due to financial incentives relat-
ing to the market structure in which the hospitals
provide health services and the insurance status of the
patients, health administrators and policymakers should
minimize such events. Also, since there is little know-
ledge about the underlying professional, financial, or
personal incentives for hospital admission staff and ad-
ministrators regarding inter-hospital patient transfer de-
cisions, this suggests a direction for future research.
With the expansion of managed care, hospitals have
provided significant discounts to those insured by Medi-
care, Medicaid, and commercial insurers. However, they
have not discounted their charges and in fact have even
raised them for the uninsured because there have been no
negotiations between the uninsured and the hospitals. In
order to protect the uninsured from such high prices, in
2006 California adopted a fair pricing law that prohibits
hospitals from charging the uninsured the full amounts or
significantly higher fees. Five years after the inception of
this fair pricing law, most Californian hospitals have been
equipped with financial assistance programs for the unin-
sured [24] and the uninsured have been asked to pay a
lower amount of the hospital charges.
Although Florida has not had such a law that protects
the uninsured, the recent health care reform under the
ACA provided an opportunity to cover those who are cur-
rently uninsured. Yet, the current Scott Administration in
Florida has opposed the Medicaid expansion program that
would have insured the low-income uninsured. Even
though Florida’s Low Income Pool (LIP) health-funding
program has been recently extended for two additional
years [25], the funds help hospitals cover the costs of treat-
ing uninsured and underinsured patients after the fact,
rather than increasing eligible Floridians’ health insurance
coverage as the Medicaid expansion program would have
done. If the uninsured had been covered by the Medicaid
expansion program, they would not have been transferred
to other hospitals mainly due to financial reasons as our
findings indicate. It is too early to predict what will happen
in Florida in terms of covering the uninsured. If they re-
main uninsured, however, they are more likely to be trans-
ferred to other hospitals, especially when they are admitted
to a hospital that dominates its hospital market.
As managed care promotes a lower cost of providing
health care services while maintaining a high quality of
care, similar to other states, Florida has attempted to in-
crease the enrollment of its Medicaid managed care pro-
grams. As a result, Medicaid enrollment grew 3.4 times
faster than its population growth during the period be-
tween 1990 and 2010. Along with the increase in Medicaid
enrollment, Florida’s Medicaid expenditures increased at
an annual rate of 10.1 % during the same time period.
Based on other states’ experiences (such as New York), as
Medicaid enrollment increases, the level of competition
that hospitals encounter increases. In such a situation, the
difference between allowable charges and costs would
become smaller and smaller. If the uninsured remain un-
insured, the financial pressures the uninsured would
experience would be greater because hospitals would
charge them higher prices.
Certainly, there are necessary patient transfers based
on medical reasons. If it is necessary to transfer a patient
to another facility based on medical reasons, it should
be promoted. Due to the data limitations, however, we
were unable to examine patient sharing from a perspective
of “from which hospital to which hospitals based on med-
ical reasons.” Furthermore, we expect that the construction
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of a longitudinal network dataset of inter-hospital patient
transfers in future research will allow us to determine what
kinds of dyadic characteristics between hospitals motivate
or incentivize hospitals to transfer patients to each other.
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